In this work, an oblivious transfer with complex access control scheme that is constructed based on ciphertext policy attribute based encryption (CP-ABE) 
Introduction
Electronic transactions such as accessing medical records or financial data require that access to these resources should be protected and the information which datum item is accessed is sensitive. Hence, it is necessary that these transactions should be protected, such that the following requirements are met: (1) . The privacy of users is preserved, that is to say, the service provider is oblivious to which user accesses which datum item; (2) . The service provider ensures that the only users who possess the sufficient attributes are authorized to access the data. With the advent of cloud computing, outsourcing sensitive information to cloud makes these requirements more compelling. To preserve the users' privacy and let the service provider (database) enforce access control mechanism, cryptographers proposed oblivious transfer with access control to solve the aforementioned requirements.
To enable one to securely share data over an insecure network, encryption techniques are employed. In the symmetric cryptography setting, if the two users communicate the sensitive data, they need to hold the same secret key. It is acceptable for some small organizations. With the advent of Internet, the above solution becomes infeasible. To solve the key distribution problems in the symmetric cryptosystem, Diffie and Hellman proposed the public key cryptosystem in which any two parties can securely share the sensitive data without having a mutually held secret key. The symmetric cryptosystem
Related Work
Coully S. [7] [8] are the first to propose oblivious transfer with access control using state graphs where the users obtain credentials which bind them to a particular state in the graph. Their scheme enforces access control by limiting the possible transitions between states. This scheme has the following advantages: (1) . It is suitable for different oblivious transfer schemes; 2.The access control policies are allowed to be changed on condition that the database is not changed. However, their scheme has the drawbacks as follows: (1) .Each time the database is accessed by a user, a new credential must be obtained by the user. (2) .This scheme cannot efficiently express a large class of access control policies based on state graphs. Camenisch J. [9] proposed an oblivious transfer with access control where each user can obtain a credential which certifies whether the user has some attributes employed to describe each record of data, and a user can access the record if and only if the user has these attributes, which makes access policies only support AND logical gate. To support access policy in disjunctive form, the database server needs to replicate the record, which makes the size of database increased. Additionally, to directly
e is a bilinear map 
Access Structure
Access Structure (Beimel A.) [12] . Let S denote the attribute universe. An access structure on S is a collection A of non-empty subsets of attributes, i.e. {} 2\  

: if B  A and BC  , then C  A . In our scheme, we only deal with monotone access structure.
Linear Secret Sharing Scheme
A secret sharing scheme  over a set of attributes is called linear over 
is negligible in the security parameter  , in which
Ciphertext Policy Attribute Based Encryption
A CP-ABE scheme comprises the four algorithms as follows:   .
The model is secure against chosen ciphertext attacks by allowing for decryption oracles in phase 1 and phase 2. Definition 3.5.1. A CP-ABE scheme is secure if no PPT adversary has non-negligible advantage in the aforementioned game.
Zero Knowledge Proofs
In a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge, a prover proves a statement to a verifier without revealing anything about the statement other than its veracity. We employ the notation introduced by Cramer R. et.al. [16] . 
Fully Simulatable Oblivious Transfer
We employ the fully simulatable adaptive oblivious transfer protocol due to Camenisch J. et.al. [15] , in which a sender possesses N messages, of which a recipient can adaptively pick to receive k one after the other, such that the sender learns nothing about the recipient's choices, and the receiver only learns about the k requested messages, whereas the remaining messages are hidden from the recipient.
Definitions

Scheme Overview
An oblivious transfer protocol with complex access control from ciphertext policy attribute based encryption is run between an issuer that sets up the system and generates the private keys of users; one database that hosts the list of records, generates the encrypted records by employing CP-ABE schemes and allows users to 
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Scheme Definition
An adaptive oblivious transfer with complex access control from ciphertext policy attribute based encryption (OTAC-ABE) comprises the algorithms as follows:
( 1 , 
Definition of Security
Security of an OTAC-ABE protocol is defined through indistinguishability of a real world and an ideal world experiment (Canetti. R. [17] ). In the real world, there exist many players running some cryptographic protocols with each other, an adversary A including the dishonest players controlling some of the players, and an environment E providing the inputs to the honest players, receiving their outputs and interacting with the adversary arbitrary. In the ideal world, there exist the same players which do not run cryptographic protocols but send their inputs to and receive their outputs from an ideal fully-trusted party T that applies the functionality that the cryptographic protocols can realize, an adversary including the dishonest players, and an environment E providing the inputs to, receiving the outputs from the honest players, and interacting arbitrarily with the adversary.
Cryptographic protocol set can securely implement a functionality if for every environment E and for every real world adversary A there exists an ideal world simulator * A which controls the same parties in the ideal world as A does in the real world in such a way that the environment is not able to distinguish whether it is run in the real world interacting with A or whether it is run in the ideal world interacting with the simulator * A . Real world. Only can the users return the result to the environment E , whereas the issuer and the database output nothing to the environment E . 
Construction
In this construction, a ciphertext policy attribute based encryption scheme is combined with simulatable adaptive oblivious transfer to achieve oblivious transfer with fine grained access control in the standard model. We employ hybrid encryption to design a new ciphertext policy attribute based encryption scheme that supports the same expressive access structure as the original CP-ABE scheme. This scheme is implemented via combining the underlying CP-ABE scheme with data encapsulation mechanism (DEM) (Herranz, J.. [18] ). We employ this new CP-ABE scheme combined with simulatable adaptive oblivious transfer to achieve oblivious transfer with fine grained access control in the standard model. Our construction is as follows: 
Proof of Security
We analyze the security of the proposed protocol via proving indistinguishability between adversary actions in the real world and in the ideal world. Given a real world attacker A , an ideal-world attacker * A is constructed in such a way that no environment E can distinguish whether it is interacting with A or * A . We organize the proof in the following lemmas based on which parties are corrupted. The cases are not considered as follows: all parties are honest or dishonest, and the issuer is the only honest or dishonest party, since they have no real practical interest. For the remaining each case, we define a sequence of hybrid games Game-0,…, Game-N to prove the indistinguishability between the real and ideal worlds.
In 
Hybrid Hybrid
Game-2:
This game is identical to Game-1, except that all ill-formed ciphertexts checked via running . ABE CiphertextValidityCheck must be rejected. The committing property of the CP-ABE scheme ensure that the same ciphertext will be decrypted to the same plaintext by employing any valid private keys if 
Game-3:
This game is identical to Game-2, except that at the first transfer query dictated by E , the simulator 
Game-2:
This game is identical to Game-1, except that during each transfer phase it lets the user query a record picked at random if the user possesses the private keys associated with the attribute sets satisfying the access structure. ,we represent it by employing an access tree whose internal nodes are OR gates and AND gates, and leaf nodes denote attributes; in our scheme and XSF scheme [19] , the encrypted record size is due to disjunction via duplication. By directly supporting disjunction, our scheme and XSF scheme [19] greatly reduces the size of encrypted database. For issuing phase, these three schemes have communication complexity linear in the number of attributes possessed by some user. For initialization phase, these three schemes have computation complexity linear in the number n of messages. For transfer phase, our scheme and XSF scheme have communication complexity linear in the cardinality of the universe of attribute, whereas that of CDN scheme is linear in the attribute number possessed by some user; however, in the CDN scheme, user U only obtains a record, whereas our scheme U and XSF scheme obtains all the records which he is authorized to access. It is seen that XSF scheme is identical to our scheme in terms of Access Policy, Encrypted Record Size, Issuing Phase, Initialization Phase, and Transfer Phase, but the security model of our scheme is standard model, whereas the security model of XSF scheme is random oracle model. Hence, when access policies are complex or the number of records authorized to access is larger, our scheme is more efficient than the CDN scheme. Our scheme is stronger than XSF scheme in terms of security. 
Conclusion and Future Work
In this work, we propose an oblivious transfer scheme with complex access control from ciphertext policy attribute based encryption in the standard model which greatly enhances expressiveness for access policies, and reduces the size of encrypted database. Furthermore, the communication complexity in the transfer phase of our scheme is constant in the number of records accessed. However, the access policies of our scheme are public. In the future work, we will design a scheme where access policies are hidden to furthermore enhance privacy preserving to meet the highly sensitive requirements such as electronic medical database. Moreover, to further enhance the expressiveness, we plan to combine the attribute based encryption for circuit with oblivious transfer to achieve user privacy and the database access control.
